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The creation of a global structure of international courts (ICs) has been an on-
going project throughout the twentieth century and well into the twenty-first. It was—
and is—part of a more general endeavor of creating an international community 
governed by law. While the proliferation of ICs has been described elsewhere,1 we 
know surprisingly little about who the actual judges sitting at the helm of 
contemporary judicialized international law and ruling (on) the world are. What has 
once been termed the “invisible college of international law”2 remains to a large extent 
invisible to this day. But it is now a much larger college as the proliferation of ICs has 
resulted in a corresponding multiplication of the number of international judges. 
Today, more than three hundred men and women hold the office of international 
judge.3 Most are found in Europe, at the two regional courts of the Court of Justice of 
 Mikael Rask Madsen is Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, and Director 
of iCourts, The Danish National Research Foundation’s Center of Excellence for International 
Courts. The statistical analysis included in this Article has been facilitated by the help of Troels 
Kjeldberg, a visualization expert at iCourts, and Ioannis Panagis, computer scientist at iCourts. This 
research is funded by the Danish National Research Foundation Grant no. DNRF105 and conducted 
under the auspices of iCourts. Thanks to the participants at the Conference on The Globalization of 
Legal Education: A Critical Study, University of California, Irvine School of Law 8–9 September, 
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1.  See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014); Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 553–579 (2002); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, (2005); Cesare P. R. Romano, The 
Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 752, 
(1999). 
2.  Oscar Schachter, Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217 (1977). 
3.  Leigh Swigart & Daniel Terris, Who are International Judges?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
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the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, but many other 
regional and global courts also employ a significant number of international judges.4
Besides some mainly descriptive studies of the international judiciary,5 we have very 
little analysis of who these people are and what commonalities they have, notably in 
terms of education, knowledge, and know-how.6
In a previous work, in collaboration with Niilo Kauppi, I have argued that the 
expanding international judiciary is increasingly taking the form of what we coined a 
“transnational power elite.”7 We understand a transnational power elite as a 
transnational grouping that is not simply powerful due solely to its institutional 
affiliation, but also by its collective, transnational capital in terms of knowledge and 
know-how of global governance, as well as its connectedness to key national and 
international legal-political sites.8 Thinking in terms of transnational power elites—
instead of relying on an institutionalist understandings—provides a different access 
point for analyzing thinking about global governance.9 Moreover, by approaching the 
international judiciary as a transnational power elite, the fallacy of institutional analysis 
can be avoided; that is, it is not the institutions as such that are seen as governing the 
world (in this case ICs) but the transnational power elites constituting and instituting 
them. The basic argument is, therefore, the following: in order to make intelligible the 
power and interest of global legal governance, it is necessary to invert the common 
logic of inquiry of international institutional analysis by asking not only which 
organizations and rules govern, but who governs those organizations and rules. In the 
case of ICs, that involves an analysis of judges.10
This Article builds on earlier research and logic of inquiry into the same. The 
guiding research question, therefore, is the extent to which international judges are 
indeed such transnational power elites that have both the knowledge and connections 
marking such a social group. Or, alternatively, whether they are more localized players 
OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 619, 621 (Cesare P. R. Romano, et al. eds., 2014). 
4.    Id. at 622. 
5.   See generally DANIEL TERRIS, ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES (2007). 
6.   Antonin Cohen, Dix Personnages Majestueux En Longue Robe Amarante : La formation de la cour 
de justice des communautés européennes, 60 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 227, 227 (2010); 
Antonin Cohen & Mikael R. Madsen, Cold War Law: Legal Entrepreneurs and the Emergence of a European 
Legal Field (1945-1965), in EUROPEAN WAYS OF LAW: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
175, 176 (Volkmar Gessner & David Nelken eds., 2007); Antoine Vauchez, Une Élite D’Intermédiaires: 
Genèse d’un capital juridique européen (1950-1970), in ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES
54, 166–167 (2007). 
7.   See generally TRANSNATIONAL POWER ELITES: THE NEW PROFESSIONALS OF 
GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SECURITY (Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2013); Mikael R. 
Madsen, The International Judiciary as Transnational Power Elite, 8 INT’L POL. SOC. 332, (2014). 
8.   Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. Madsen, Fields of Global Governance: How Transnational Power Elites 
Can Make Global Governance Intelligible, 8 INT’L POL. SOC. 324, 325-26 (2014). 
9. Id. at 325. 
10. Mikael R. Madsen, Socio logical Approaches to International Courts , in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 388, 391-94 (Cesare P. R. Romano, et al. eds., 
2014). 
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connecting to more national or regional sites of knowledge, law, and politics? The 
present analysis is, however, limited in two ways. First, it does not address the larger 
social spaces created around ICs and their agents. The focus is instead on a more 
limited set of agents, namely international judges. Second, to speak to the larger 
project of a critical study of the globalization of legal education, the analysis is further 
limited to a study of the educational capital of the international judiciary. While this is 
obviously a limitation to the analysis, the focus on educational capital11 is nevertheless 
helpful for drawing up a general picture of the international judiciary and its relative 
cosmopolitan profile. In its most basic sense, educational capital is an institutionalized 
form of cultural capital that confers a set of unique properties on the holders of such 
capital.12 In the case of judges, who virtually all have law degrees, the unique property 
is the capacity to speak law and determine its contents—what is sometimes referred to 
as legal capital.13 Since practically all agents analyzed in this study have that capital, it is 
not analytically fruitful to focus on legal-educational capital as such. What is 
interesting, however, is the relative internationalization of the international judiciary in 
terms of education: i.e., are international judges national legal champs promoted to 
international tasks? Or are they internationally trained and thereby part of a more 
cosmopolitan segment of the legal profession?14
The empirical analysis included in this study presents unique new data that has 
been collected with the goal of, among other things, unpacking the educational profile 
of the international judiciary. More specifically, the Article conducts a comparative 
analysis of judges at nine international courts based in Africa, Europe, Latin America, 
and the Caribbean. These courts operate in different legal subject matters. Three are 
human rights courts: the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”), and the African Court of Human and 
Peoples Rights (“ACtHPR” or “AF”); three are regional economic courts: the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), the East African Court of Justice 
(“EACJ”), and the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ”); and three are courts with a 
global reach: the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the World Trade 
Organization’s Appellate Body, and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). As 
explained in detail in the sub-sections of the empirical study, the analysis compares 
these nine ICs in a set of different dimensions with the goal of identifying similarities 
and differences based on region, nationality of judges, age, frequency of studies 
11.  See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE FIELD 
OF POWER (1996). 
12.  See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in CULTURAL THEORY: AN ANTHOLOGY
(Imre Szeman & Timothy Kaposy eds., 2011). 
13.  Yves Dezalay & Mikael R. Madsen, The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the 
Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433, 438 (2012). 
14.  A similar line of inquiry has been pursued in a set of publications by Bryant Garth and 
Yves Dezalay that explores legal elites, ranging from international arbitrations to national statesmen, 
and how their positioning between national and the international legal and political fields create a 
particular transnational legal power. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL 
REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2010). 
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abroad, and attendance of elite universities. 
The analysis proceeds the following way. In the first section, I briefly discuss the 
object of inquiry and some common ways of approaching it—and how the present 
study compares to the state of the art. I also provide a short introduction to the 
dataset and its sources. Then, the empirical study follows. In the first section of the 
empirical study, the Article explores how international international judges actually are 
when assessed in terms of education. The section explores this question using both 
aggregated and disaggregated data on the nine ICs included in this study. The second 
empirical section asks the question of how elitist international judges are when measured 
against their education and the educational institutions that they frequently attend. 
This section also explores the occurrence of doctoral degrees among international 
judges. The Article concludes with a general discussion of the relative 
cosmopolitanism of the international judiciary and its implications. 
STUDYING THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY
The first truly international court (“IC”), the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (“PCIJ”), was set-up in 1922 under the auspices of the League of Nations. 
After an initial period of significant activity in the 1920s—a mere jazz-age of 
international law—the situation became more difficult in the 1930s as the court 
increasingly faced the rising tension between major European powers. The PCIJ was 
eventually suspended when WWII broke out. It was resurrected in 1946 as the ICJ; the 
principal organ of the new United Nations organization, itself in-part a continuation of 
the defunct League of Nations. The PCIJ impacted the idea of the international 
judiciary in a less visible yet equally important way. Of particular interest are the many 
debates documented in the travaux préparatoires about who could—or should—be 
appointed as a judge to rule on matters involving sovereign states. 
A set of pre-existing professional groupings emphasized their respective 
qualifications in this regard. International law professors found themselves particularly 
competent, in part due to their long commitment to creating international courts and 
institutions. Diplomats also saw themselves fit for the task ahead, even the obvious 
choice for the new job. And, finally, judges—at this point implying only national 
judges—found themselves having the right set of skills.15 The first bench of the PCIJ 
was a compromise between these competing professional groupings: “three judges, 
three legal advisers and five professors.”16 This caused some consternation among 
diplomats, but the dominant group of law professors turned out to be good at striking 
a balance between legal development and political sensitivity. Some forty years later, a 
group of European judges, dominated by law professors at the ECtHR, would exhibit 
15. Mikael R. Madsen, Judicial Globalization: The Proliferation of International Courts, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 282, 286 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2016). 
16. See generally Ole Spiermann, The Legacy of The Permanent Court of International Justice: 
On Judges and Scholars, and Also on Bishops and Clowns, in LEGACIES OF THE PERMANENT 
COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 397 (Christian J. Tams & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 2013). 
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traits of “legal diplomacy that resembled the PCIJ.”17 Current cases before ICs also 
suggest that the job of judging international affairs involves both legal development 
and political sensitivity.18 This raises the fundamental question of whether the 
international judiciary is influenced by a form of path dependency derived from its 
original post-WWI configuration. 
Existing studies of international judges generally confirm that the international 
judiciary is still influenced by these original dynamics. According to one study, by 2006 
there were 215 international judges from 86 different countries.19 Of these 215 judges, 
136 were European—most were British and French. Most interesting, however, is that 
the professional profile of the judges has generally followed the path of the PCIJ: 40 
percent were mainly legal academics, 33 percent had pursued careers as judges, and 27 
percent had been civil servants of various kinds. By 2012, the number of judges had 
climbed to 304, distributed among twenty-one ICs.20 111 different nationalities were 
represented, notably by a growth in ICs in Africa. 26 percent had a judicial 
background, 21 percent a civil servant background, and 19 percent came from legal 
academia.21 The rest came from private practice or combinations of the above 
categories.22
I have, in previous publications, challenged these categorizations used by Terris 
et al. as producing an early one-dimensional portrait of international judges as being 
either professors, civil servants, or judges.23 In-depth studies focusing on a single court 
suggest that a crucial feature of many international judges is a long and complex career 
weaving in and out of the above categories as well as other professional jobs, notably 
in policy expertise and politics. A telling example is the first bench of the ECtHR 
evoked above.24 It was made-up of elite legal academics—some 80 percent had a 
doctoral degree—who had worked in or had had real access to a number of other 
relevant spheres in law and politics.25 Moreover, this study suggests that these actors 
were not quite as “denationalized” as critics of ICs often argue.26 They were instead 
very powerful domestic actors who had been promoted to international posts due to 
important national careers and who maintained deep connections to their home states. 
17.  Mikael R. Madsen, ‘Legal Diplomacy’ - Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar European Human 
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A CRITICAL HISTORY 62, 77–78 (Stefan 
Ludwig Hoffmann ed., 2011). 
18.  See generally KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (Oxford, 2001); Gregory C. Shaffer et 
al., The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 
(2016). 
19.  TERRIS, ET AL., supra note 5, at 17. 
20.  Swigart & Terris, supra note 3, at 621. 
21.  Id. at 626. 
22.  Id. at 621. 
23.  Mikael R. Madsen, The International Judiciary as Transnational Power Elite, 8 INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 332, 334 (2014). 
24.  Id. at 333–34. 
25.  Id.
26.  Id. at 334. 
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In other words, although they were international when sitting at the ECtHR, they were 
in practice first and foremost prestigious senior lawyers in their domestic fields. 
These existing studies have all mainly assessed the international judiciary by 
using different professional categories. This Article seeks a different assessment in 
terms of education. Turning to the educational capital of international judges provides 
a different, but also complementary, way of addressing the questions related to the 
configuration of the international judiciary. International judges are generally perceived 
as holding elite positions within the international legal profession. The question is 
what role education, and particularly commonalities in education, plays in the 
formation of this elite group. If we accept that education is an access point to the legal 
market rather than its ends, the question is whether international legal education, 
notably from prestigious international universities, abounds in the curricula vitae of 
international judges. Or, alternatively, whether it is the top national universities which 
provide the pathway to the position of international judge. A third hypothesis could be 
that the selection of international judges is simply not influenced by their educational 
profile. Existing data from the cited studies give some tentative answers to these 
questions. Terris et al. observe in 2007 that the world’s most prestigious universities, 
including Oxford, Cambridge, London and Paris in Europe, and Harvard, Yale, and 
Colombia in the United States, had trained (as primary or secondary degree) close to 
one-fourth of all international judges—the majority being trained in the United 
Kingdom.27 They also indicate that judges originating from the developing world 
might be more likely to have pursued studies abroad. 
This study tests these hypotheses against the backdrop of new data on the 
education of all judges appointed to the nine ICs included in the dataset. More 
specifically, we have drawn up a list of all judges appointed to these nine courts since 
their inception and then collected data on the judges’ individual education. Since some 
courts have been in operation for many decades, for example the ICJ, the ECtHR, and 
the ECJ, these courts contribute to the dataset with a relatively high number of judges. 
Also, some international judges have held positions at more than one IC. In those 
cases, they are counted for each appointment to an IC. Please note that this is a very 
rare occurrence and without statistical significance. The total number of judges 
included in the dataset is 504. 
Using data on the birthplace of individual judges, we coded their education as 
being either national or international in terms of whether they studied at home or 
abroad. In the empirical analysis, we also, in some instances, include the name of the 
universities where they received their degree to identify universities which have 
educated many international judges. The data is also coded so that we can identify 
gender, nationality, and the IC where the judges work or have worked. Moreover, 
based on nationality or the location of the IC where they have been employed, we can 
test for regional and sub-regional differences regarding education. We have also 
included data on the year of appointment to the relevant ICs in order to identify 
27.  TERRIS, supra note 5, at 18. 
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different historical moments in this regard. 
The data was generally collected using a host of sources: the yearbooks of ICs; 
the “Who is Who” of a number of countries; and various on-line sources such as 
newspapers, homepages, and LinkedIn accounts. The information is generally cross-
checked against multiple sources when possible. In some instances, we have not been 
able to detect the place of studies. Of the 504 judges included in the dataset, we lack 
information about the degree-issuing university in the cases of 52 judges; that is, in 
roughly 10 percent of the cases, we lack the specific name of the institution, but we 
have data indicating whether the judge studied abroad or not. In the bigger picture of 
this study, however, we deemed these limitations to be statistically insignificant. 
HOW INTERNATIONAL ARE INTERNATIONAL JUDGES? STUDYING HOME OR 
ABROAD?
Some scholars of globalization have argued that globalization is driven by a 
global class. Samuel Huntington, for example, identifies denationalization as a key 
feature of global elites, what he terms “Davos Men”; that is, they are internationalists 
who pose a threat to the coherence of the nation-State and, specific to Huntington’s 
analysis, the “American Creed.”28 Another author, David Rothkopf, is even more 
radical and argues for the emergence of a global “superclass.”29 This new class, 
comprising some 6,000 individuals, according to the author, is defined by the fact that 
their connections to one another are more important than their connections to their 
home countries.30 These are just some examples of literature highly critical of what 
they present as the rise of a class of globalizers with scant respect for the culture and 
interests of their countries of origin.31
The critique of denationalized globalizers is also very well-known to students of 
ICs and international judges. ICs have been repeatedly accused of existing in an 
artificial international legal bubble, far away from the complexities of national societies 
and politics, and without a sense of obligation towards their home states.32 The 
assumption is often that such globalizers have mutual affiliations that formed during 
their education. Aspiring judicial globalizers—as other members of this alleged global 
class—are assumed to meet and connect in elitist educational grounds much in same 
28.  Samuel P. Huntington, Who are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity 
257–58, 268 (2004); See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (2003). 
29.  DAVID ROTHKOPF, SUPERCLASS: THE GLOBAL POWER ELITE AND THE WORLD THEY
ARE MAKING xiv (2008). 
30.  Id.
31.  For a broader literature review, see Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. Madsen, Transnational Power 
Elites: The New Professionals of Governance, Law and Security, in TRANSNATIONAL POWER ELITES: THE 
NEW PROFESSIONALS OF GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SECURITY 1, 1–15 (Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. 
Madsen eds., 2013). 
32. See generally SPYRIDON FLOGAITIS, ET AL., THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: TURNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH (2013); PATRICIA POPELIER, ET AL.,
CRITICISM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – SHIFTING THE CONVENTION SYSTEM:
COUNTER-DYNAMICS AT THE NATIONAL AND EU LEVEL (2016). 
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way that the old British elite mingled at Eton and Oxford in earlier days. It is, of 
course, an empirical question whether this is the case, and one we explore below. 
Figure 1 below examines the extent to which international judges have studied at 
home or abroad. Studying abroad is defined as having earned a university degree from 
a country other than one’s home country. The statistics on home/abroad in Figure 1 
are split into three time periods: (1) before 1970, (2) 1970-1990, and (3) after 1990. 
The rationale for these periods is that ICs, up until 1970, were a very limited 
phenomenon; with only the ICJ at the international level and the ECJ and the ECtHR 
regional courts in Europe.33 In the subsequent period—1970-1990—a number of 
other regional courts were established in Latin America and Europe.34 In the third 
period, after 1990, there was a significant increase in the number of regional courts in 
Latin America and Africa, as well as in Europe by the creation of new global courts.35
Figure 1 presents the number of international judges having received degrees abroad 
or at home for all courts included in the dataset in two visualizations. Figure 1a 
provides simple descriptive statistics. Figure 1b visualizes the findings as stacked bar 
charts. 
Figure 1a: Location of Education Home/Abroad – All Courts 
Before 1970 1970 to 1990 After 1990 
Abroad 20.33% 19.35% 31.71% 
Home 79.67% 80.65% 68.29% 
Figure 1b: Location of Education Home/Abroad – All Courts
33.   Please note that we have not included data on the judges of the predecessor of the ICJ, 
the PCIJ. Our data therefore starts in 1946. 
34.   Madsen, supra note 15, at 288–89 (noting the general expansion of IC’s). 
35.  For details on the general evolution of ICs, see Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of 
European Style International Courts, 35 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 135, 136–37 (2012); Madsen, supra 
note 15, at 285–89; YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS
1–3 (2014). 
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What is most striking from Figures 1a and 1b is the relatively small percentage of 
international judges who have actually studied abroad. Before the 1990s, only one out 
of five international judges had studied abroad. After 1990, the number climbs to close 
to 32 percent. Considering these findings, it is questionable that international judges 
form close-knit international groupings at the time of their education. That said, it 
does not exclude the possibility that they create other, more indirect bonds in terms 
of, for instance, studying very similar subjects at different institutions, or being 
introduced to similar moral or political ideas. Our dataset, however, cannot detect that. 
Figure 2 below disaggregates these numbers to identify whether some ICs are more 
international than others in terms of the educational background of its judges. Figure 2 
uses the same periods as above but disaggregates the data so the percentages for each 
court are visible. In Figure 2a, the data is presented in simple descriptive data and, in 
Figure 2b, as stacked bar charts. 
Figure 2a: Location of Education Home/Abroad – Individual Courts/Periods
Court Education Location Before 1970 1970 to 1990 After 1990 
AF Abroad 28.26% 
Home 71.74% 
CCJ Abroad 73.33% 
Home 26.67% 
EACJ Abroad 57.14% 
Home 42.86% 
ECJ Abroad 0.00% 21.05% 19.39% 
Home 100.00% 78.95% 80.61% 
ECtHR
Abroad 22.50% 12.94% 24.78% 
Home 77.50% 87.06% 75.22% 
IACHR
Abroad 11.11% 12.77% 




ICJ Abroad 23.19% 27.63% 33.64% 
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Figure 2b: Location of Education Home/Abroad – Individual Courts/Periods
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What is apparent from Figures 2a and 2b is that there are significant differences 
between the individual courts regarding how many judges studied abroad. Also, the 
extent to which international judges have studied abroad increased significantly in the 
third period (after 1990). This increase in study abroad is largely the result of the 
educational trajectories of judges at non-European ICs, notably in Africa (EACJ) and 
the Caribbean (CCJ). New global courts such as the WTO AB and the ICC also 
generally have more judges who have studied abroad. 
We can better identify these patterns by differentiating the ICs according to the 
location of the courts. Figure 3 below distinguishes between European courts (ECJ 
and ECtHR), courts in the Americans and Caribbean (IACtHR and CCJ), in Africa 
(EACJ and AF), and global courts (ICC, ICJ, WTO AB)(marked “international” in the 
figure). As in the previous analyses, in Figure 3a we present the simple descriptive 
statistics and in Figure 3b we use stacked bar charts. In Figure 3b we only include the 
two last periods (1970-1990 and After 1990) to have a richer dataset. In Figure 3a we 
indicate the raw numbers as well as the percentages in order to highlight the actual 
number of judges analyzed. 
Figure 3a: Education Home/Abroad by Location of Court/Time
Period Continent  Abroad  Home Abroad   Home
Before 
1970
Europe 9 45 17% 83% 
Americas 0 0
Africa 0 0




Europe 19 104 15% 85% 
Americas 2 16 11% 89% 
Africa 0 0
International 2 55 4% 96% 
After 
1990
Europe 75 249 23% 77% 
Americas 17 45 27% 73% 
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Africa 37 51 42% 58% 
International 99 146 40% 60% 
Figure 3b: Education Home/Abroad by Location of Court/Time
Figure 3 underscores the findings of Figure 2 above, namely that ICs in Africa 
are the most international in terms of the judges having studied abroad. This is 
probably, to a large extent, the result of the availability of advanced degrees in those 
countries and, relatedly, the attractiveness of degrees from abroad in the local job 
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market.36 The global courts, probably because of increased influence of non-Western 
judges, are also increasingly internationalized in terms of the education of the judges. 
A final assessment of the relative internationalization of international judges, in 
terms of education, can be done by differentiating the international courts not 
according to location or specific court as in the previous figures, but by looking at the 
subject-matters that the courts specialize in. In our dataset, we identify three courts in 
the area of regional human rights (ECtHR, IACtHR and AF), three in regional 
economic law (ECJ, EACJ and CCJ), and three in global matters (ICJ, ICC and WTO 
AB). Figure 4 below provides, first, the simplified statistics (Figure 4a) and then a 
visualization using stacked bar charts (Figure 4b). 
Figure 4a: Education Home/Abroad Subject Area of Court
Abroad Home 
Economic 30.98% 69.02% 
Global 36.26% 63.74% 
Human rights 22.16% 77.84% 
Figure 4b: Education Home/Abroad Subject Area of Court
In these aggregated numbers for each of the three subject-areas of the ICs in 
focus, we find that the least internationalized area is international human rights. 
Interestingly, this area of international law makes the most direct claim to universality 
of international law, but it is nevertheless the least internationalized in terms of the 
education of the judges who end up ruling on matters of international human rights. 
36.  This generally corresponds with the findings on the globalization of education. As 
concerns international law, see ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 67 
(2017) (noting that receiving a foreign law degree is associated with increased job prospects). 
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One plausible explanation is that the member-states drawing up the list of candidates 
for positions at ICs in the area of human rights are well aware that the universalizing 
discourse on international human rights might be countered by the appointment of 
judges who are more trained in national ways of understanding human rights. A recent 
study of the ECtHR confirms this explanation, arguing that the way in which the 
member-states have recently sought to counter the Europeanizing tendencies of the 
ECtHR has been by promoting national judges to the international bench.37 Such 
appointment strategies, it appears, seek tacitly to ensure that knowledge and know-
how of domestic legal systems are readily available with the goal of influencing the 
system at large.38
ELITE UNIVERSITIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY
This Article has so far mainly presented data that differentiated ICs with regard 
to whether the judges employed by those courts have studied abroad or not. We have 
not, however, zoomed in on whether they have studied in some particular areas of the 
world or at some specific universities when they pursue their studies. This section 
seeks to answer that question by providing data on the universities that most 
frequently issued degrees to international judges. Using this data, we also seek to 
visualize, on a world map, the center of global legal education as it concerns 
international judges. Finally, we test for the prevalence of advanced degrees in terms 
of doctoral degrees and whether the pursuit of advanced degrees can explain patterns 
of relative internationalization of judges at ICs. 
As noted above, it is often assumed that globalization is driven by a certain class 
of people who are educated at the same universities and thereby bestowed with inter-
subjective ideas about politics, economics and law. Historically, universities have 
played a major role in the reproduction of elites as documented in numerous studies 
of the Ivy League in the United States, Oxbridge in the United Kingdom, or the grandes 
écoles in France, for example.39 Law faculties or law schools are often highlighted as 
particularly elitist sites of education—however not always because of academic rigor 
but more often because of the social connections which can be acquired at those 
establishments.40 For the purpose of this analysis, it is not relevant whether elite law 
schools provide rigorous training or good social connections. The main goal is to 
identify whether there are single institutions or clusters of institutions that have trained 
a significant number of international judges. 
Using our dataset on international judges, Figure 5 below calculates the top ten 
universities that have educated most international judges. The assessment is made by 
37. Mikael R. Madsen, The Legitimization Strategies of International Courts: The Case of the European 
Court of Human Rights, in SELECTING EUROPE’S JUDGES 259, 277 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015). 
38. Swigart & Terris, supra note 3, at 623 (noting some ways in which nationality of 
international judges is significant) . 
39. The literature is very large, but see for example PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY:
ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE FIELD OF POWER 315–26 (1996); Michael Hartmann, Class-specific Habitus and 
the Social Reproduction of the Business Elite in Germany and France, 48 THE SOC. REV. 241, 245 (2000);Dean 
Lillard & Jennifer Gerner, Getting to the Ivy League: How Family Composition Affects College Choice, 70 THE 
J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 706, 724 (1999); Ann L. Mullen, Elite Destinations: Pathways to Attending an Ivy 
League University, 30 BRITISH J. SOC. OF EDUC. 15, 17 (2009). 
40. See generally RALF DAHRENDORF, LAW FACULTIES AND THE GERMAN UPPER CLASS, in 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 294 (Wilhelm Aubert ed. 1969). 
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adding up the total number of degrees issued by each university to persons who have 
been appointed to the ICs included in this study. 
Figure 5: The Top Ten Universities in the Education of International Judges
University Top Ten Descending  Total 
University of Cambridge 38
University of London 33
Harvard University 25
University of Paris 24
University of Oxford 19
Columbia University 14
Yale University 11
University of Madrid 10
University of Bonn 10
New York University 10
To scholars of elite international legal education, this top ten list comes with few 
surprises. Indeed, some of the best-known international elite universities in the U.K., 
the U.S., and France appear on the list. Considering the general European dominance 
on ICs, and international law more generally, it is also unsurprising that European elite 
universities are represented with four out of the top five institutions on the list. 
Among the positions from six to ten, we do find some surprises, notably the 
University of Bonn. We have no particular explanation for the place of the University 
of Bonn except that its location close to the Benelux countries has made it attractive 
for more students, and it is generally well-respected in Germany for legal education. 
Other major German universities are also repeat players but they are not reflected on 
Figure 5. This is because Figure 5 only includes the ten highest-scoring universities. 
But because of the decentralized profile of German higher education, quite a few 
universities (Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Berlin, Hamburg and Munich) are the producers 
of degrees for international judges.41 Less surprising is that the University of Madrid 
appears on the list, considering its attraction for Latin American students pursuing 
advanced degrees in law in Spanish. The remainder of the universities (Yale, 
Colombia, and NYU) is all well-known institutions of international elite education in 
law, and in the field of international law. Their lower position on the list probably 
reflects that there are only a limited number of U.S. international judges. 
41.  Mikael R. Madsen, Universities in the Education of International Judges Dataset (2017). 
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Comparing the set of identified universities, notably the list of universities with a 
score of more than ten degrees, and other universities that have trained international 
judges, we can visualize the landscape of educating international judges using the tool 
of so-called heatmaps. This allows us to visualize where the “heat is on” in terms of 
the higher education of international judges. Figure 6a presents the heatmap of the 
entire world in this regard. 
Figure 6a: Heatmap of Major Educational Institutions of the International Judiciary
It is apparent from Figure 6a that a small cluster of universities around the Paris-
London axis and surroundings and the traditional U.S. East Coast legal educational 
establishment are the leading producers of international judges. To further identify 
these patterns, Figure 6b below uses a different visualization technique that, in 
addition to coloring the location of major universities, also adds circles relative to the 
number of graduates of that institution. In addition, labels have been added for the 
top universities in this regard. 
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Figure 6b: Major Educational Institutions of the International Judiciary
Both Figure 6a and 6b highlight the centrality of the same few educational 
institutions to the training of international judges. A few additional institutions of 
relevance, however, can be observed using this visualization, notably the National 
Autonomous University of Mexico and Moscow State University. The former, it 
appears from the dataset, has trained a number of Latin American judges.42 The latter 
has catered to East European judges, particularly from neighboring countries of the 
former Soviet Union.43 Another circle worth noting is in Kampala, Uganda, where a 
number of African judges have received training.44
The statistics presented in Figures 5 and 6 do not distinguish between regular 
degrees or advanced degrees. The existing studies of international judges cited above 
generally suggest that there is a relative high number doctoral degree holders among 
international judges.45 In what follows, we first detect the total number of doctors 
among international judges in the dataset, and then see if we can identify particular 
patterns with respect to the different ICs included in the analysis. For doctoral degree 
we included a set of post-graduate degrees that lead to the title doctor, including Ph.D, 
LL.D., and Doctor Juris. However, a J.D. degree is not considered a doctoral degree in 
this context as it is a law degree more similar to a European candidatus/candidata juris.46
In the charts below, judges without doctoral degrees are not considered. As a 
consequence, the CCJ is not included in the figures as none of its judges have received 
doctoral degrees.47
42.  See id.
43.  See id.
44.  See id.
45.  See id.
46.  See id.
47.  We also exclude from the analysis honorary doctoral degrees. 
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Figure 7 provides the statistics on the relative frequency of doctoral degrees 
among international judges. Figure 7a first provides the general picture of the 
frequency of doctoral degrees among international judges in absolute numbers and in 
percentage in three different time-periods. Figure 7b distinguishes the different ICs in 
this regard and provides the percentage of judges with doctoral degrees at the 
individual courts. 
Figure 7a: Number of Doctoral Degrees and Number of Judges per Period
Period No. of Doctoral Degrees Total No. of Judges Percentage 
Before 1970 44 70 62.9% 
1970 to 1990 67 123 54.5% 
After 1990 192 356 53.9% 
Figure 7b: Percentage of Doctoral Degrees at Individual Courts per Period
Before 1970 1970 to 1990 After 1990 
AF 0.0% 0.0% 26.3% 
EACJ 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 
ECJ 44.4% 45.5% 57.1% 
ECtHR 82.6% 70.6% 64.6% 
IACHR 0.0% 41.7% 51.9% 
ICC 0.0% 0.0% 40.6% 
ICJ 55.3% 42.1% 48.8% 
WTO 0.0% 0.0% 87.0% 
Figures 7a and 7b make an interesting finding. International judges, when 
compared to the legal profession at large, have a disproportionately high number of 
individuals with doctoral degrees. Although the average figure has been declining since 
the first period (Figure 7a), the current number is close to 54 percent, which is high 
when compared to the legal profession at large. Only legal academia as an institution 
can compete with that. Among courts, the only other major national court that has a 
similarly high percentage of judges with doctoral degrees is the German Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), which has a 100 percent score of doctoral degrees in its 
First Senate and 75 percent in its Second Senate.48 Other major supreme courts do not 
come close to these numbers.49 However, as Figure 7b illustrates, there is also 
noticeable variation among the courts. The two African courts included in the study 
have the lowest total number of doctoral degrees. At the other end of the continuum, 
48.  For details, see Bundesverfassungsgericht, LEAFLET ABOUT THE FED. CONST. CT., http:// 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Service/Infothek/Faltblatt/faltblatt_node.html (2017). 
49.  This was based on a brief internet survey of major supreme courts around the world, 
including the United States, South Africa, India, the United Kingdom, and France. 
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we find the WTO AB, which has close to 90 percent. The ECtHR, which started out 
with 80 percent of the judges holding doctoral degrees, has now dropped to 65 
percent. Overall, for the courts included in this study, around 50 percent of the judges 
hold doctoral degrees. 
Figures 8a and 8b below identify the patterns with regard to each of the courts 
studied regarding whether the holders of doctoral degrees have studied abroad or at 
home. Figure 8a provides the simple statistics of the percentage of holders of doctoral 
degrees who have studied abroad or at home, as well as the total number. Please note 
that judges without doctoral degrees are not included in Figure 8a. Figure 8b provides 
a different analysis, namely the percentage of judges with doctoral degrees in the total 
number of judges split between degrees awarded at home or abroad. 








Court No. % No. % No. %
AF Abroad 3 60.00% 
Home 2 40.00% 
EACJ Abroad 2 66.67% 
Home 1 33.33% 
ECJ Abroad 0 0.00% 2 20.00% 5 15.63% 
Home 4 100.0
0%
8 80.00% 27 84.38% 
ECtHR Abroad 6 31.58
%
9 25.00% 17 20.24% 
Home 13 68.42
%
27 75.00% 67 79.76% 
IACHR Abroad 1 20.00% 3 21.43% 
Home 4 80.00% 11 78.57% 
ICC Abroad 7 53.85% 
Home 6 46.15% 
ICC Abroad 4 19.05
%
4 25.00% 8 38.10% 
Home 17 80.95
%
12 75.00% 13 61.90% 
WTO Abroad 50.00% 
Home 50.00% 
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Figure 8b: Judges with Doctoral Degrees per Period and Court and Location of 
Degree
As it appears from these final statistics, there is a noticeable variation among the 
courts studied with regard to the location of the institutions that have awarded the 
doctoral degrees to its international judges. Compared with the analysis presented 
above in Figures 2 and 3, about the frequency of studies abroad, the pattern with 
respect to doctoral degrees is similar. Most judges with doctoral degrees received from 
abroad are found in African courts (AF and EACJ) and at new global courts (ICC and 
WTO). However, the number of doctoral degrees among African judges is, as 
demonstrated right above, the lowest in the total dataset when excluding the CCJ. The 
regional courts in Europe (ECJ and ECtHR) and Latin America (IACtHR) stand out 
as the least international in this regard. It is well-known that, at least until recently, the 
value of domestic doctoral degrees in law was generally very high, notably in 
Europe—and in some European countries, notably the larger ones, higher than 
foreign doctoral degrees.50 This underlying logic is probably reflected in the patterns 
seen with regard to the two European courts. It is possible that the same is the case 
with regard to the IACtHR in terms of a valorization of domestic degrees. Moreover, 
it is likely that the choices of governments, when identifying candidates for regional 
ICs, are influenced—deliberately or not—by considerations of knowledge of domestic 
law. All things being equal, domestic doctoral degrees are more likely to focus on 
nationally-informed questions than degrees from abroad. But this remains speculative 
and cannot be supported by the dataset used in this analysis. 
50.  See generally ROBERTS, supra note 36. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The number of international courts has proliferated over the past two decades, 
resulting in a multiplication of the number of international judges. Currently, more 
than three hundred men and women hold the office of international judge. A fair 
share of these judges are found at the two mega-regional courts of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR, but many other regional and global courts now also employ a significant 
number of international judges.51 Scholarship of ICs has generally been marked by an 
institutionalist approach. This has provided very little insight into who the men and 
women are who decide important cases in international human rights, international 
economic law, international criminal law or, for example, draw up the boundaries of 
states. This Article has attempted to unpack the international judiciary by a 
comparative analysis of nine ICs based in Africa, Europe, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean in order to provide a more precise picture of this alleged global class of 
judges. 
The Article has more precisely addressed two related questions by examining the 
educational backgrounds of international judges. First, how international  international 
judges are in practice as measured by their educational background. Second, whether 
international judges belong to an international elite in terms of having studied at the 
same international elite educational institutions. To answer those two questions the 
Article first conducted a number of statistical analyses on the general educational 
profile of international court judges, as well as variations among them related to their 
location and subject-matter jurisdiction. The study then identified the role of elite 
universities in the production and reproduction of international judges, as well as the 
frequency of international judges with doctoral degrees, another marker of distinction 
of this professional group. 
Generally, and perhaps counter to popular intuition, we can observe that 
international judges are predominantly trained at domestic institutions of higher 
education. This is particularly true for European ICs, while African and Caribbean ICs 
employ more internationally trained judges. Global courts, particularly the ones 
established since 1990 (WTO AB and ICC), also feature a larger proportion of 
internationally trained judges. In fact, the general patterns of internationalization of 
their education are similar to students in general, including students of international 
law.52 International judges, however, stand out with regard to the frequency of 
doctoral degrees among them as compared to the legal profession at large. More 
historical studies of ICs note that international judges, since the PCIJ, have included 
many academics or semi-academic lawyers. This, in part, accounts for the high 
frequency of doctoral degrees. Another explanation is that doctoral degrees function 
as a marker of distinction when appointing international judges. The holders of 
doctoral degrees have, in other words, a slight competitive advantage over other jurists 
in the competition for seats on the international bench. 
The general conclusion of this study is that international judges hardly form a 
detached or denationalized elite based on their educational profile. In fact, the data 
and analysis presented suggest that international judges tend to be educationally 
embedded in national legal fields. This finding seems to confirm earlier studies of 
global legal elites that have similarly emphasized how international lawyers make large 
51.  See id. 
52.  See id. 
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parts of their careers in domestic fields.53 What is highlighted by such studies, as well 
as the present one, is that the international sphere of law to a large extent is a 
continuation of domestic forms of reproducing elites.54 The different patterns 
observed in this study between, for example, Europe and Africa are in fact not 
different from the regional models of producing elites. While European elites typically 
pursue elite education in their top national universities, African elites are more likely to 
go abroad. The case of the CCJ, with its extreme internationalization, is clearly a case 
in point in this regard. 
Education is, of course, only one way of assessing the social construction of the 
international judiciary. To get a fuller picture, one will also have to study the longer 
professional trajectories of the relevant agents. What such studies tend to find is that 
international judges have multiple engagements across relevant social fields. In many 
cases, these agents are quite embedded in national legal fields—both educationally and 
professionally—but they are not limited by these boundaries, a typical trait of elites 
everywhere. To understand the real power of ICs, therefore, it is necessary to look 
beyond the institutionally delineated category of judges and include in the analysis the 
broader transnational, professional constituency emerging around these institutions 
and practices. It is precisely the rise of this broader complex of legal power and power 
elites, in which international judges play a key part, that has made international courts 
prominent features of global governance. 
53. PIERRE BOURDIEU, Foreword, in DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER vii, viii (Yves 
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 1996); MIKKEL JARLE CHRISTENSEN, International Prosecution and 
National Bureaucracy: The Contest to Define International Practices Within the Danish Prosecution Service, 43 
LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 12 (2016). 
54. See Dezalay & Madsen, supra note 13 (providing further discussion). 
